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SEC Enforcement of the Rule IOh-5 Duty To Disclose 
Material Information-Remedies and the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Case 
On April 16, 1964, the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company announced 
one of the most significant mineral discoveries of the twentieth 
century-a major copper and zinc deposit near Timmins, Ontario, 
found by means of geophysical exploration and exploratory drilling.1 
Unusual market activity prior to this announcement prompted a 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation of insider 
stock transactions.2 In April 1965, the SEC brought suit against a 
group of Texas Gulf insiders, alleging that their purchase of stock 
on national exchanges before the disclosure of the information con-
cerning the Timmins strike constituted a violation of section I0(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as implemented by rule I0b-5.3 
The SEC sought relief under section 2l(e) of the act, which pro-
vides for the issuance of an injunction against future violation;! 
1. Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1964, p. 2, col. 2; see Sheehan, Great Day in the 
Morning for Texas Gulf Sulphur, Fortune, July 1964, p. 137. 
2. Post-trial Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff, pp. 3-4, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964), 
provides in part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange .•• 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
Rule IOb-5, 17 CFR 240.l0b-5 (1964) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates, or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
All of the individual defendants had made purchases of Texas Gulf shares prior to 
any effective public disclosure of the Timmins strike. However, the district court found 
that, contrary to the SEC contention, the fact of the strike did not become "material" 
until after April 9, 1964. Thus, only two of the individual defendants were held to 
have violated rule lOb-5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Snlphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 286-87 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) [hereinafter referred to as Texas Gulf]. Both sides have appealed. 
Appeal docketed,,No. 30882, 2d Cir., Oct. 24, 1966. By consent of the parties, remedial 
questions were reserved for a later hearing. Texas Gulf at 266. 
4. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 2l(e), 48 Stat. 899, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(e) (1964), provides in part: 
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about 
to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of 
(944] 
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and, in addition, requested rescission and restitution on behalf of 
the private parties who had sold shares of Texas Gulf to the defend-
ants or to parties who purchased on the advice of defendants. 5 
However, the Securities Exchange Act's remedial provisions do not 
specifically authorize an SEC action for a monetary recovery6 and, 
since this is the first time that the Commission has asserted this pre-
rogative, it may be timely to examine the SEC's authority to seek 
such remedies. The first part of this Comment will focus on the two 
possible bases for an SEC suit for rescission and restitution or for 
other new enforcement measures. Assuming that the courts are 
authorized to give such relief, two questions remain to be discussed 
in the second part of the Comment: (I) What are the relevant cri-
teria for developing a new enforcement scheme for violations of 
section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act; and (2) What specific 
enforcement measures should the courts create in order to further 
the purposes of that act? 
I. JUDICIAL CREATION OF NON-STATUTORY 
ENFORCEMENT MEASURES 
A. The Ancillary Power of an Equity Court 
The Securities Exchange Act provides a specific enforcement 
scheme to be implemented by the Attorney General and the SEC. 
The Attorney General is authorized to bring criminal suits, 7 whereas 
the SEC is entrusted with the responsibility for enforcing the re-
porting and disclosure requirements,8 conducting investigations,9 
and obtaining injunctions to prevent future violations.10 Although 
there are several other enforcement measures, including provisions 
the provisions of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation thereunder, it may in 
its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States or 
the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing 
a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without 
bond. 
5. Complaint, pp. 33-34, Texas Gulf. The SEC, following Texas Gulf, has requested 
a monetary remedy in a number of cases. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 
623 (D. Ariz. 1966); SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608 (D.P.R. 1966); SEC v. Gioconda 
Mining Co., Civil No. 1512/1965 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 19, 1965). 
6. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 2l(e), 48 Stat. 899, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(e) (1964), which is the only provision that gives the SEC standing before the 
courts, authorizes only an injunction. 
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 48 Stat. 904, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. 
(1964). 
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19, 48 Stat. 898, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78s 
(1964). 
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 2l(a)•(d), 48 Stat. 899, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a)•(d) 
(1964). 
IO. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2l(e), 48 Stat. 899, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(e) (1964). 
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for the bringing of private civil suits in specified situations,11 no-
where is the SEC given the power to seek money damages. 
Congressional authorization of these specific enforcement mea-
sures might arguably imply the exclusion of others.12 The courts, 
however, have not accepted the doctrine of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius in interpreting securities legislation.13 Rather, 
they have employed the concept of statutory tort to supplement 
the civil remedies enumerated by the act14 and, when an injunction 
has been sought under section 2l(e), they have used their inherent 
equity power to provide relief ancillary to the injunction when such 
relief has been necessary for the adequate protection of investors.15 
To date this theory of ancillary relief has been employed only to 
allow the appointment of a receiver.16 However, in its pretrial mem-
orandum of law, the SEC indicated that it would rely on this theory 
in its attempt to collect a monetary judgment in Texas Gulf.11 
The development of the ancillary theory in other areas of the 
law indicates that the doctrine is sufficiently well established to 
support the SEC's claim for rescission and restitution. Indeed, sup-
port for this position can be found dating from 1946 when the 
Supreme Court decided Porter v. Warner Holding Co.18 In Warner, 
the price administrator brought an action under section 205(a) of 
the Emergency Price Control Act, which provides that "upon a 
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 19, 48 Stat. 898, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78s 
(1964) (power to stop trading on a national exchange); 15, as amended, 49 Stat. 1377 
(1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964) (power to revoke the license of a non-
complying broker). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18, 48 Stat. 889, 
896, 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), p(b), r (1964), authorize private civil suits 
in specific and limited circumstances. 
12. This is a general rule of statutory construction. See, e.g., Botany Worsted Mills 
v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929); United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918, 
921-22 (9th Cir. 1956). 
13. See SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943); Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
14. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., supra note 13. 
15. See 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1824-28 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 
Loss]. 
16. See Los Angeles Trust Deed 8: Mortgage Exchange v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 180-81 
(9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 
(1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946); SEC v. H. S. Simmons 8: Co., 190 F. 
Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). For a case which has extended the ancillary theory so as to 
allow restitution in the area of securities regulation, see SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608 
(D.P.R. 1966). In Wong the district court approved an award of restitution to injured 
investors as a remedy ancillary to an injunction under § 42(e) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 842, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4l(e) (1964), which has language 
similar to that of § 2l(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This case, however, 
cannot be considered authority for the restitutionary remedies requested in the present 
case. Section 42(e), unlike 2l(e), indicates a specific congressional intent that the SEC 
should have a more direct role in the regulation of investment companies, since it 
specifically authorizes the appointment of a trustee, in addition to the conventional 
injunction. 
17. Pretrial Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff, pp. 48-53, Texas Gulf. 
18. 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
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showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is 
about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or tem-
porary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted 
without bond."19 In addition to an injunction, the administrator 
sought an "other order," one that would compel the defendant to 
make restitution of amounts collected in excess of the established 
maximum price. The Supreme Court, affirming the granting of the 
order, noted that the authority to grant an award for restitution 
was within the traditional power of a court with equitable jurisdic-
tion and that the award was authorized by the "other order" lan-
guage in the statute.20 Originally, there was some uncertainty as to 
the basis of the holding and at least one court has interpreted the 
decision as sanctioning equitable relief ancillary to an injunction 
only if the language in the grant of jurisdiction is as broad as the 
"other order" language of the Emergency Price Control Act.21 How-
ever, the more persuasive, and recently accepted, interpretation is 
that Warner stands for the proposition that, whenever an act 
authorizes equitable jurisdiction, ancillary relief which is neces-
sary to protect the public interest and which effectuates the purposes 
of the act is within the court's traditional power whether or not the 
statute contains "other order" language. 
This latter approach is best demonstrated by a series of cases 
arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Section 17 of the act, 
as originally enacted, provided only that the courts have "jurisdic-
tion for cause shown to restrain violations of section 15 of this 
title .... "22 Despite the absence of a broad grant of equitable juris-
diction, the Second Circuit held, as early as 1944, that section 17 
entitled the Secretary of Labor to obtain from equity not only an 
19. Emergency Price Control Act ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 33 (1942). (Emphasis 
added.) 
20. 328 U.S. at 398-400. 
21. See United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956). One commentator 
has suggested that 
the SEC also has some general statutory language that, like the term "other order" 
in W amer, might be found to provide an "explicit" basis for a rescission order: 
section 2l(f) of the 1934 act gives the Commission power to apply to the courts 
f?r an injunction "commanding any person to comply with the provisions of this 
title .••• 
Note, 79 HARv. L. REv. 656, 660 (1966), This argument is untenable, however, because 
§ 21(f) of the 1934 act, 48 Stat. 900, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(f) (1964), makes 
provision for "writs of mandamus commanding any person to comply with the provi-
sions of this chapter • • . ," not equitable injunctions. The purpose of a writ of 
mandamus is to compel the future performance of ministerial or official duties, but 
not discretionary or remedial acts. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Roughton v. Ickes, 
101 F.2d 248, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Thus § 21(f) was intended to give the SEC the 
power to force filing or correction of required reports, and it cannot be used as a 
basis for remedial orders. Although writs of mandamus have been abolished in federal 
practice, § 21(f) can still be considered authority for the SEC to seek orders similar in 
scope under the new federal procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(b); see SEC v. Atlas Tack 
Corp., 93 F. Supp. Ill (D. Mass. 1950). 
22. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 17, 52 Stat. 1069 (1938). 
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m3unction but also an order directing reimbursement of wages 
lost due to illegal dismissal.23 In 1949, the Secretary's enforcement 
powers were expanded again when the Second Circuit ordered resti-
tution of unpaid minimum wages.24 Congressional disapproval of 
this expansion resulted in an amendment to section 17 to the effect 
that no court shall have jurisdiction, in any action brought by the 
Secretary of Labor, to order the payment of unpaid minimum wages 
or unpaid overtime compensation or an additional equal amount as 
liquidated damages in such actions.25 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court was willing to create non-statutory 
remedies. In Mitchell v. Robert Demario Jewelry, Inc.,26 the Court, 
distinguishing between restitution of unpaid minimum wages, pro-
hibited by the congressional proviso, and reimbursement of wages 
lost due to illegal dismissal, granted the Secretary of Labor's request 
for reimbursement. The Court, relying heavily on Porter v. Warner, 
ignored the "other order" grounds for that decision.27 
On the basis of this approach, the SEC would not have to rely 
on a specific statutory authorization to support its request for rescis-
sion and restitution so long as congressional purposes would be 
effectuated by such an award. Indeed, section 21 ( e) of the Secur-
ities and Exchange Act is even more amenable to ancillary remedies 
than was section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act since the latter 
contained a congressional proviso condemning ancillary remedies. 
One problem which is presented by the Securities Exchange Act 
is that the statute clearly indicates that the SEC is to enforce the 
act through prospective means whereas the redress of past wrongs 
23. Walling v. O'Grady, 146 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944). 
24. McComb v. Frank Scerbo &: Sons, 177 F .2d 137 (2d Cir. 1949). 
25. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1949, ch. 736, § 15, 63 Stat. 919. 
26. 361 U.S. 288 (1960). The § 17 injunction was designed to encourage the reporting 
of minimum wage violations, by preventing discriminatory discharge of employees 
reporting such violations. 
27. After noting the Court of Appeals' mistaken reliance on "the principle that to 
be upheld the jurisdiction here contested 'must be expressly conferred by an act of 
Congress or be necessarily implied from a Congressional enactment,' 260 F .2d at 933," 
the Court in De Mario quoted the following langnage from Warner: 
Thus the Administrator invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court to enjoin 
acts and practices made illegal by the Act and to enforce compliance with the 
Act. Such a jurisdiction is an equitable one. Unless otherwise provided by statute, 
all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the proper 
and complete exercise of that jurisdiction. And since the public interest is involved 
in a proceeding of this nature, those equitable powers assume an even broader 
and more flexible character than when only a private controversy is at stake .••• 
(T]he court may go beyond the matters immediately underlying its equitable 
J~risdiction • • • and give whatever other relief may be necessary under the 
crrcumstances .•.. 328 U.S., at 397-98. 
The court then continued: "The applicability of this principle is not to be de-
nied, ••• because [the Court in Warner] ••• went on to find in the language of the 
statute affirmative confirmation of the power to order reimbursement." 
361 U.S. at 290-91. 
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is left to private civil suits.28 A suit by the SEC for a money judg-
ment on behalf of private parties might therefore be construed as 
an unnecessary invasion of the remedial area reserved for private 
actions. However, the SEC has stated in its pretrial memorandum 
of law that it considers its action to be necessary in order to deter 
future illegal use of inside information and that therefore it "is 
not acting in this case as an instrument for particular individuals 
but only to enforce and apply section IO(b) and rule IOb-5 in the 
public interest.''29 
Whether rescission and restitution are in fact appropriate means 
for enforcing the act in the public interest will be discussed in the 
second part of this Comment. A more serious drawback to the use 
of the ancillary theory lies in the limitations inherent in the term 
"ancillary." In order for the award of money damages to be truly 
"ancillary," the injunction would seemingly have to be central to 
the suit. However, section 2l(e) authorizes the SEC to seek an 
injunction only "whenever it shall appear to the Commission that 
any person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices 
which constitute or will constitute a violation .... "30 This language 
indicates that an injunctive suit may not be proper in Texas Gulf 
since the violations have already occurred and the subsequent pub-
lic disclosure of the mineral discoveries has precluded further in-
sider profits. Absent a basis for injunctive relief, the court would 
seemingly lack the equitable jurisdiction from which it could have 
proceeded to the ancillary questions. To avoid this apparent limita-
tion on their authority to fashion remedies, the courts have gen-
erally been willing to infer the threat of a future violation from the 
mere fact of a past violation.31 Furthermore, the SEC has argued 
that, if the injunction is sought in good faith, ancillary relief is ap-
propriate even if no injunction is granted.32 If this type of rationali-
zation is accepted, the granting of the injunction itself is clearly of 
little importance and the characterization of the relief actually 
granted as "ancillary" becomes merely a fictionalized means by 
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2l(e), 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964), gives the SEC the authority to seek an injunction only when a 
person "is engaged or about to engage" in a violation. 
29. Pretrial Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff, p. 51, Texas Gulf. For a discussion 
of the propriety of an SEC action to obtain a remedy for injured private parties who 
can sue on their own, as distinguished from an SEC regulatory enforcement action, 
see Note, 79 HARv. L. REV. 656 (1966). 
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2l(e), 48 Stat. 899, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(e) (1964). 
31. See SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963); Los Angeles Trust Deed &: 
Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 180-81 (9th Cir. 1960); SEC v. Boren, 283 F.2d 
312 (2d Cir. 1960) (Per curiam); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 1959). To 
avoid an injunction once a violation has been shown, the wrongdoer must demonstrate 
that there is no "reasonable expectation" of future violation, and this "burden is a 
heavy one." United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). 
32, Pretrial Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff, pp. 53-54, Texas Gulf. 
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which the court avoids the limitations of the statute.33 Thus, al-
though there may be sufficient precedent for applying the ancillary 
theory in Texas Gulf, its use should be avoided in favor of an al-
ternative theory which more accurately describes the nature of the 
relief sought by the SEC. 
B. Section 27 Jurisdiction and the New Federal Common Law 
The SEC is requesting the courts to exercise their inherent law-
making power so as to fashion appropriate remedies for the more 
effective enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act. The decision 
in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins34 might, at first blush, appear to be an 
obstacle to the court's ability to fashion such remedies, but Erie did 
not deprive the federal courts of all power to develop a federal com-
mon law.35 Indeed, once the federal courts were no longer able to 
fashion a federal common law to be applied in diversity of citizen-
ship cases involving state questions, they devoted greater attention 
to their role as developers of law in areas of federal interest, es-
pecially with respect to the fashioning of remedies which would 
effectuate various federal statutory schemes.36 
Judicial willingness to imply new remedies in areas governed 
33. Arguably, an order directing rescission might be characterized as a "mandatory 
injunction" and thus authorized by the express terms of § 2l(e). Compare Creedon v. 
Randolf, 165 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1948), where the court held that an order directing 
restitution of rent overcharges was a "mandatory injunction" which would be proper 
under § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 33 (1942). This 
argument has been alluded to by the SEC. Pretrial Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff, 
pp. 53-54, Texas Gulf. However, unlike § 2l(e), § 205(a) contains the "other order" 
language, which in the Warner case had been held to justify the restitutionary 
remedy. More important, § 205(a) clearly authorizes the administrator's resort to the 
courts in order to remedy past violations. Section 2l(e), on the other hand, clearly 
contemplates "injunctions" which are prohibitory and prospective in operation, rather 
than remedial. Compare Securities Exchange Act § 21(e), 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964), with Emergency Price Control Act ch. 26, § 205(a), 
56 Stat. 33 (1942). 
34. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
35. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U.L. REv, 363 (1964). 
36. One year after Erie, the Court considered the right of an Indian to the return 
of taxes collected in violation of a treaty with the United States. The treaty did not 
mention remedies, but Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, held that Con-
gress had "left such remedial details to judicial implication." Board of County Comm'rs 
v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1939). These remedies were derived from the 
federal right and did not depend upon state law. Thus Erie did not preclude federal 
courts from creating implied remedies for the protection of federal rights. Accord, 
Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940). In Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 
317 U.S. 173 (1942), a suit involving a question of patent licensee estoppel under the 
antitrust laws, the Court said: 
When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature of 
the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial 
determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which are to be 
derived from the statute and the federal policy which it has adopted. 
Id. at 176. 
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by federal law has been expressed in a number of ways. The afore-
mentioned cases utilizing the ancillary theory to extend administra-
tive enforcement power under the Emergency Price Control Act and 
the Fair Labor Standards Act are one example.37 In the field of invest-
ment securities, the courts have implied various civil remedies. For 
example, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,38 the district court 
inferred from section I 0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act a cause 
of action for damages resulting from a sale of securities induced by 
the purchaser's misrepresentations. The court relied upon the theory 
embodied in section 286 of the Restatement of Torts39 that anyone 
who is injured by a person acting in violation of a legislative com-
mand may sue in tort. The court concluded: 
Of course, the legislature ... may withhold from parties injured the 
right to recover damages arising by reason of violation of statute but 
the right ... is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law 
that where it is not expressly denied the intention to withhold it 
should appear very clearly and plainly.40 
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the merits of this 
statutory-tort doctrine, the Kardon decision has been cited with ap-
proval in ten of the circuits and consequently appears to be well 
established.41 Admittedly, the statutory-tort doctrine is available 
only to those persons who have been injured by conduct which vio-
lates a federal statute-a class from which the SEC is clearly ex-
37. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); Porter v. 
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons, 177 F.2d 137 
(2d Cir. 1949); Walling v. O'Grady, 146 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944). 
38. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
39. REsrATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934), provides: 
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing 
to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of 
another if: 
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest 
of the other as an individual; and 
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and, 
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular 
hazard, the invasion of the interests results from that hazard; and, 
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so 
conducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action. 
40. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See 
generally 3 Loss 1421-74, 1763-97; Comment, Civil Liability Under Section JO(b) and 
Rule lOb-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658 
(1965). 
41. See cases cited Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658 n.4 (1965). Some of these cases have 
been criticized on the ground that implication of remedies enables the circumvention 
of specific congressional limitations on private suits. See 3 Loss 1789-90; Ruder, Civil 
Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 
627 (1963). However, in 1963, when Professor Loss participated in a symposium on 
Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 856 (1963), he said: 
"Do we want Kardon overruled? ••• It is almost like asking whether we would like to 
see the school segregation cases overruled, despite the problems they have created." 
Id. at 867. 
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eluded. Furthermore, as noted earlier,42 the ancillary theory is in-
appropriate in a Texas Gulf situation. However, for the purposes 
of this discussion, these cases are significant in that they are evi-
dence of the fact that the courts are willing to exercise their law-
making power in the fashioning of extra-statutory remedies. 
Moreover, in implying new federal common-law remedies, the 
Supreme Court has not rested solely on the ancillary and statutory 
tort doctrines. Rather, it has inferred the power to fashion all ap-
propriate remedies for violations of a federally created duty from 
a general jurisdictional grant. The Court's clearest expression of 
this approach was in the 1957 case of Textile Workers v. Lincoln 
Mills.43 In Lincoln Mills, the relevant statute was section 30l(a) 
of the Labor Management Relations Act, which gives the courts 
jurisdiction over "suits for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization representing employees in an in-
dustry affecting commerce .... "44 The Court found that this sec-
tion authorized the federal courts "to fashion a federal law for the 
enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements,"45 and that 
the law to be applied in such suits "is a federal law, which the 
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.''46 
Since Lincoln Mills arose under a statute which grants jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts without providing a specific enforcement 
scheme, it is not directly applicable to a suit brought pursuant to 
the Securities Exchange Act which does provide specific remedies. 
Nevertheless, in ]. I. Case Co. v. Borak,47 the Supreme Court in-
voked the Lincoln Mills rationale in authorizing the courts to de-
velop new remedies under the Securities Exchange Act. In Borak, 
a stockholder contesting a merger alleged that his proxy had been 
solicited by means of false and misleading statements in violation 
of section 14(a) of the act.48 The Court looked to section 27 of the 
act which states: 
The district courts of the United States, ... shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations 
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to 
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and 
regulations thereunder.49 
42. See text accompanying note 33 supra. 
43. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
44. Labor Management Relations Act, § 30l(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 
(1964). 
45. 353 U.S. at 451. 
46. Id. at 456. Although this Comment focuses on the remedial aspects of the case, 
the law developed under Lincoln Mills is both substantive and remedial. See Bickel &: 
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957). 
47. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964), 
49. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964). 
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Although this language might be construed as merely jurisdictional 
in nature, the Court held that it also provides the authority for the 
district courts to create new remedies that will promote the con-
gressional objectives behind the Securities Exchange Act. The 
Court therefore found that the plaintiff had a cause of action for ei-
ther rescission of the merger or restitution. Since this was a civil rem-
edy for an injured private litigant, it might be argued that Borak is 
simply an extension of the statutory-tort doctrine. However, the 
court did not invoke the statutory-tort doctrine, nor did it cite 
Kardon or any other case that has relied upon this theory. Instead, 
it based its decision directly on section 27 saying: 
We consider only the question of whether § 27 of the Act authorizes 
a federal cause of action for rescission or damages to a corporate 
shareholder with respect to a consummated merger which was au-
thorized pursuant to the use of a proxy statement alleged to contain 
false and misleading statements . . . . 50 
In answering this question, the Court cited Lincoln Mills and other 
cases in which the courts have invoked their broad power to create 
new federal common law.51 It concluded: 
It appears clear that private parties have a right under§ 27 to bring 
suit for violation of § l 4(a) of the Act. Indeed, this section specifically 
grants the appropriate District Courts jurisdiction over "all suits in 
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty 
created" under the Act.52 
In light of the Court's approach and the cases upon which it 
relied, it is apparent that, as in Lincoln Mills, the Court was infer-
ring from a broad jurisdictional grant the authority to fashion reme-
dies to effectuate the purposes underlying the act. Borak, then, 
can be viewed as an additional step in the judicial trend toward 
flexibility in the enforcement of federal duties. As such, it is clearly 
applicable to the Texas Gulf suit for rescission and restitution, a 
"suit ... in equity brought to enforce ... [a] duty created" under 
50. 377 U.S. at 428. 
51. In addition to Lincoln Mills, the Court cited Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 
317 U.S. 173 (1942), and Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940). 377 U.S. at 428; see 
note 36 supra. 
52. 377 U.S. at 430-31. This approach was anticipated by Deckert v. Independence 
Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940), which granted implied remedies under the Securities 
Act of 1933 before the statutory tort doctrine became popular: 
The Securities Act does not restrict purchasers seeking relief under its provisions 
to a money judgment. On the contrary, the Act as a whole indicates an intention 
to establish a statutoi1' right w~ch the litigant may enforce in designated courts 
by such legal or eqmtable actions or procedures as are normally available to 
him •••• Moreover, in § 22(a) (15 U.S.C. § 77v) specified courts are given jurisdic-
tion "of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or 
duty created by this suochapter." The power to enforce implies the power to make 
effective the right of recovery afforded by the Act. 
311 U.S. at 287-88. 
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the act.53 Therefore, the court in Texas Gulf has the authority to 
grant the requested remedies and to add whatever new measures are 
necessary to the enforcement scheme. 
II. PROPER ENFORCEMENT OF THE Texas Gulf DuTY 
A. Congressional Purpose 
Judicial creation of extra-statutory remedies has been justified 
as necessary for the effectuation of congressional objectives,64 and 
the securing of this goal must therefore be the standard by which 
proposed new remedies are evaluated. Consequently, before turning 
to a discussion of the possible means of enforcing the duty at issue 
in Texas Gulf, it is appropriate to examine the underlying philos-
ophy of the Securities Exchange Act and to determine the scope 
and content of the l0b-5 duty placed upon the defendant insiders. 
As stated by the SEC in its Report of Special Study of Securities 
Markets, "the keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities 
legislation is disclosure."65 The disclosure philosophy is based on 
the assumptions that the investing public will be al;>le to protect 
itself, if informed, and that potential wrongdoers will be deterred 
by the probability of publicity.56 The Securities Act of 1933 re-
quires disclosure at the time of the issuing of a security and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 expands this practice by requiring 
continuous periodic disclosures of corporate information.57 
Section lO(b) of the 1934 Act makes it illegal to "employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe .... "58 The 
Commission has implemented this section by promulgating rule 
I0b-5, a general fraud rule which has become one of the provisions 
53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat. 902, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa 
(1964). 
54. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964); Mitchell v. Robert 
DeMario Jewelry Co., 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960). 
55. SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at I (1963). 
56. See I Loss 21, 121-28. See generally Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of 
Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607 (1964). 
57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12-13, 48 Stat. 894, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 781-m (1964), require registration and disclosure through annual reports by com-
panies whose stock is traded on a national exchange or over-the-counter market. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964), 
regulates the annual solicitation of proxies so as to insure full disclosure in the proxy 
statement or its annual equivalent. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15, as amended, 
49 Stat. 1377 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1964), regulates the conduct and 
disclosures of broker-dealers selling on the over-the-counter market. Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, § l6(a), as amended, 78 Stat. 579 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964), requires 
that insiders disclose all transactions in their companies' stock. 
58. 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1964). 
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most frequently invoked by the courts in requiring full disclosure.59 • 
The court in Texas Gulf, interpreting section IO(b) and rule IOb-5 
in light of the basic disclosure philosophy of the act, concluded 
that insiders who possess material information which is not generally 
available to the investing public must disclose such information 
before using it to their own advantage.110 The duty of disclosure is 
not absolute, for the SEC and the court admit that there may be 
legitimate business reasons for withholding information;61 indeed, 
premature disclosure which is based on what ultimately is incom-
plete information may be as misleading as delayed disclosure.62 
Moreover, the insiders themselves must necessarily be the ones to 
determine when disclosure is appropriate. However, insiders who 
fail to disclose material information must forego transactions in 
the shares of their company. Thus, although the court in Texas 
Gulf could not say that good business judgment would have dictated 
an earlier disclosure of the mineral strike, it could insist that the 
insiders refrain from taking unfair advantage of material informa-
tion and that they postpone their transactions until the disclosure 
of such information. 
In considering the purpose underlying the duty to disclose in-
side information, the court in Texas Gulf relied heavily on the 
Commission's decision in Cady, Roberts & Co.,63 which was the first 
articulation of the duty to disclose material information or forego 
the transaction: 
The Commission in Cady, Roberts & Co . ... found that the obliga-
tion to disclose material information rests on two grounds: ... "first, 
the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to 
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose 
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent 
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such informa-
tion knowing that it is unavailable to those with whom he is deal-
ing."64 
It is not surprising that the court was impressed by principles of 
"inherent unfairness," but it is doubtful that Congress intended 
to regulate all questions of fairness between corporate insiders and 
shareholders. 65 William Cary, past chairman of the SEC, has re-
59. 17 C.F.R. 240.lOb-5 (1964). 
60. Texas Gulf at 278-79. 
61. Id. at 280; Pretrial Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff, p. 30, Texas Gulf. 
62. See 3 Loss 1463; Farmer, Cary, Fleischer & Halleran, Insider Trading in Stocks, 
21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1013-14 (1966); Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the 
Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule IOb-5, 65 COLOM. L. REv. 1361, 
1378 (1965); Whitney, Section J0b-5: From Cady, Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of 
Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAw. 193, 202-03 (1965). 
63. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
64. Texas Gulf at 279. 
65. Congress has consistently rejected proposed federal incorporation statutes de-
signed to regulate all phases of corporate life. See 1 Loss 107-11. 
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cently given a more satisfactory articulation of the Cady) Roberts-
Texas Gulf concept of fairness and its role in effecting the under-
lying purposes of the securities legislation: "Everyone representing 
management may tend to forget the underlying importance of the 
stockholder in the capital market. We sometimes forget that integ-
rity in the capital markets is essential for mass capitalism."66 
He particularly emphasized "the importance of confidence, and a 
high standard of conduct by directors, as an essential ingredient 
before one can expect the private investor to begin putting his 
funds into public companies."67 Thus, the Texas Gulf duty to dis-
close promotes investor confidence by assuring the public that cor-
porate insiders serve the corporation and the investing public be-
fore serving themselves. 
Texas Gulf is concerned with insider trading on the market 
where silence (failure to disclose material inside information) rather 
than a more active type of fraud is involved. In his recent book, In-
sider Trading and the Stock Market, Professor Henry G. Manne 
indicated that trading on inside information is widespread.68 This 
conclusion is supported by a 1961 study in the Harvard Business Re-
view, which reported that forty-two per cent of the insiders who 
returned questionnaires considered trading on inside information 
to be legitimate and that sixty-one per cent expressed a belief that 
the average executive would take advantage of inside information 
if he had the opportunity.69 The SEC, therefore, is attempting to 
regulate the conduct of a large segment of the business community. 
For the most part it is not dealing with malicious or willful frauds; 
rather, it is concerned with the by-product of an underlying attitude 
which pervades the business community. The SEC's goal is to pro-
mote complete disclosure of essential information at the earliest 
possible time, and the means used to secure this goal must neces-
sarily be tailored to the nature of the conduct being regulated and 
to the attitude with which the business community approaches such 
conduct. If the measures used to enforce the duty of disclosure are 
not sufficiently stringent, they will fail to affect prevailing attitudes 
and insiders will continue to trade before disclosure. On the other 
hand, if the remedies for a breach of the duty are too harsh, the 
courts will naturally be hesitant to apply them absent flagrant or 
abusive conduct. Furthermore, in selecting proper remedies, the 
courts should consider matters of efficiency; unreasonable demands 
on the resources of either the courts or the agency should be 
avoided. 
66. Farmer, Cary, Fleischer & Halleran, supra note 62, at 1010. 
67. Ibid. But see MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 12-15 (1966), 
for a criticism of Cary's arguments. 
68. MANNE, op. dt. supra note 67, at 63, 66-68. 
69. Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen1, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 1961, 
pp. 6, 16. 
M.arch 1967] Comment 957 
B. Civil Liability as an Enforcement Measure 
Private civil suits have been frequently and successfully used 
in enforcing securities legislation. For example, stockholders have 
brought suits as "private attorneys general" pursuant to section 16(b) 
of the act in order to force insiders to return to the corporation illegal 
short swing profits. 70 Indeed, the mere threat of civil liability under 
sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 appears to have been 
instrumental in securing full disclosure through the registration of 
new issues under section 5 of that act.71 The courts have also allowed 
private individuals to bring suit for violations of rule IOb-5 on the 
theory of statutory tort, without requiring them to prove the tradi-
tional common-law elements of fraud.72 Such suits are favored by 
the Commission, for, in addition to their effectiveness, they require 
little or no agency effort.73 
However, the use of civil remedies would not be an appropriate 
means of enforcing the Texas Gulf duty. When the stock has been 
actively traded on the market, the number of potential plaintiffs 
and the amount of potential liability will be overwhelming.74 A 
footnote to the Texas Gulf decision indicates that, at the time the 
opinion was written, forty-nine private suits seeking over $77,000,000 
in damages had been filed against the defendants.75 In light of the 
magnitude of such claims, surely the courts would be inhibited from 
finding a breach of duty by any but the most obvious of violators. 
Since the Texas Gulf duty arises only where there is a failure to dis-
close material information, an essential element in establishing a 
breach of the duty is a finding of materiality. However, conscious of 
the fact that private litigants were claiming $77,000,000 in damages, 
the district court in Texas Gulf resorted to a very narrow view: 
[T]he test of materiality must necessarily be a conservative one, par-
ticularly since many actions under Section I0b are brought on the 
basis of hindsight. As stated by a former member of the staff of the 
Commission: "It is appropriate that management's duty of dis-
70. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). 
71. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 48 Stat. 77, as a.mended, 15 U.S.C. § 77{e) (1964), 
requires registration and full disclosure in connection with any new issue of a security. 
Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11-12, 48 Stat. 82, as a.mended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-Z (1964), 
provide civil liability for violation of § 5. Although few suits have been brought 
pursuant to these sections, the substantial civil liability they impose has been respon-
sible for a high degree of compliance with § 5 of the Act. See 3 Loss 1690; Note, 65 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 795, 797-99 (1967). 
72. See Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal Air Properties, 
Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). 
See generally 3 Loss 1757-71. 
73. See Cary, Israels &: Loss, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63 
CoLUM. L. REv. 856, 858-59 (1963); Cary, Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REv. 857, 860-61 
(1962). 
74. See Knauss, supra note 56, at 635 n.111; Painter, supra note 62, at 1379; 
Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 678 (1965). 
75. Texas Gulf at 267 n.I. 
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closure under rule IOb-5 be limited to those situations which are 
essentially extraordinary in nature and which are reasonably certain 
to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security if 
disclosed. A more rigorous standard would impose an unreasonable 
burden on management in its securities trading ..•. "76 
The court concluded that information is not material if it is merely 
the product of an "educated guess,"77 and therefore only the two 
defendants who purchased immediately before disclosure, when the 
existence of the mine was an absolute certainty, were held liable.78 
Thus, the magnitude of potential civil liability inhibited the court 
from developing a more meaningful concept of materiality and 
forced it to limit the Texas Gulf I0b-5 duty to "extraordinary 
cases." Such a narrow interpretation of the duty will accomplish 
little in the way of getting relevant information to the public at 
the earliest possible time. On the contrary, it may strike a serious 
blow to the objectives of the act by encouraging the non-flagrant 
use of inside information. 
Consequently, if civil liability is to be a viable means of en-
forcing the Texas Gulf duty, it must be limited. However, it is 
doubtful that the courts can develop workable limitations. One ap-
proach might be to require privity between the defendant and the 
plaintiff-that is, to limit private recovery to those persons who 
actually sold their stock to the particular defendants. But, regardless 
of the method utilized for determining the sellers who are in privity 
with the defendants, 79 no logical justification can be presented for 
allowing one seller to recover while others do not, especially since 
the identity of the purchaser is generally totally irrelevant and un-
76. Id. at 280, quoting from Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information 
Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 
1271, 1289 (1965). 
77. Texas Gulf at 283-84. 
78. Id. at 286-87. The court dismissed charges against defendant Fogarty who 
apparently considered the information sufficiently material to warrant the purchase of 
3,100 shares during the period in question. Eight hundred of these shares were pur-
chased for $22,000 between April 1, 1964, and April 16, 1964, when disclosure was finally 
made. Id. at 274. 
79. A seller might be identified by one of two methods when transactions have 
·been made on a national exchange. First, defendant's shares might be traced through 
the clearing house to the previous owner. However, time lapses in the clearing house 
process might result in the identification of a person who sold at a time completely 
removed from the defendant's purchase-even after disclosure. See LEFFLER&: FARWELL, 
THE SroCK MARKET 282-86 (3d ed. 1962). In order to circumvent the time lapse problem, 
shares could be matched by focusing on the actual transactions among brokers; a 
seller whose broker sold at exactly the same time the defendant's broker purchased 
might therefore satisfy the privity requirement. Although such tracing would be 
impractical, it would be theoretically possible, unless tl1e defendant's broker bought 
from a specialist-one who works on the market floor buying and selling from his own 
block of shares. The interposition of a specialist in the line of transactions would make 
identification of a public seller in privity with defendant buyer impossible. Id. at 
203-11. 
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known to any seller. For this reason, the courts have substantially 
eliminated the privity requirement from other I 0b-5 civil actions 
and it would appear that in the instant case there are no compelling 
policy considerations that would dictate the resurrection of privity 
as a prerequisite for civil liability.80 
A second approach for limiting civil liability would be to re-
quire each plaintiff to prove reliance-that is, to establish that he 
would not have sold the stock had the material information been 
disclosed.81 However, it is doubtful that this requirement could be 
effectively implemented since it is likely that every seller will con-
tend that disclosure would have prevented his sale, thereby requir-
ing the courts to engage in a difficult £actual determination. Thus, 
litigation would not be diminished and there is no assurance that 
the amount of civil liability would in £act be limited.82 
The above discussion suggests that the breach of the Texas Gulf 
duty should not give rise to private actions. This might appear to 
be inconsistent with the Kardon statutory-tort doctrine which recog-
nizes an extra-statutory civil remedy for parties sustaining damages 
as a result of a 10-b(5) violation. On the contrary, however, such 
a conclusion would merely give effect to the limitations placed on 
civil actions by section 28 of the act, which provides that "no person 
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of 
this title shall recover . . . a total amount in excess of his actual 
damages on account of the act complained of."83 The courts have 
construed section 28 as establishing causation as a prerequisite to 
the bringing of a private civil suit. 84 Causation is also a necessary 
80, See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Cochran v. 
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 
242 (6th Cir. 1962); Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 661-67 (1965). 
81. In List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), the court recognized 
that the traditional common-law requirement of conscious reliance is inappropriate in 
cases involving silent non-disclosure: "Such a requirement would unduly dilute the 
obligation of insiders to inform outsiders of all material facts." Id. at 463. The 
court indicated that the proper test of reliance in these cases is "whether the plaintiff 
would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had 
disclosed to him the undisclosed fact." Ibid. 
82. Class suits, while tending to decrease the amount of civil litigation, would not 
be completely effective since there must be common questions of law and fact and the 
plaintiff must insure adequate representation for the class. Moreover, some members 
of the class might withdraw to bring separate suits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; 3 Loss 1819; 
Comment, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 939 (1963). Texas Gulf itself indicates that the class action 
device will not avoid multiple suits. "At least 49 private actions are now pending in 
this court against TGS, defendants named in this action, and others •••• Some 16 of 
these are individual actions, 31 are said to be class actions, and one is a derivative 
action." Texas Gulf at 267 n.I. 
83. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28, 48 Stat. 903, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1964). 
84. See Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, &: Smith, Inc., 
303 F.2d 527,533 (10th Cir. 1962); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808,825 (E.D. Wis. 
1962), afj'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 761 
(D.N.J. 1955). 
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element of the statutory-tort theory, upon which a majority of pri-
vate parties seeking damages for IOb-5 violations must rely. 85 In 
the Texas Gulf case, if the wrong complained of is defendant's 
purchasing with an unfair advantage, the defendant did not cause 
harm to any seller because these sellers would have sold regardless 
of the defendants' unfair purchases.86 The use of a causation test 
in such a situation would therefore eliminate private actions and 
do so on the basis of statutory construction. On the other hand, 
persons who sold prior to the disclosure could contend that the 
source of their damages is the lack of disclosure and that therefore 
they were damaged within the meaning of section 28. This argu-
ment must rest on the premise that an insider has a duty either 
to disclose or to forego purchasing, and that by purchasing he elects 
to fulfill his duty by disclosing. The fallacy in this argument, how-
ever, is that both the courts and the SEC recognize that the Texas 
Gulf duty cannot realistically be framed to compel disclosure.87 
Therefore, although the duty has been stated in the alternative, it 
should be construed only as requiring insiders to refrain from pur-
chasing on the basis of undisclosed information, that is, purchasing 
with an unfair advantage. As indicated above, this interpretation of 
the duty precludes a finding of causation and thus eliminates the 
possibility of bringing a private action. 
C. Prospective and Preventive Enforcement Measures 
Absent private enforcement of the Texas Gulf duty, regulation 
by the SEC and the Attorney General becomes the only available 
means of protecting the investing public. There are several enforce-
ment measures specifically provided by the act and several alterna-
tive measures which can be developed by the courts. 
85. R.EsTA'IEMENT, TORTS §§ 286(c)-(d) (1934). An alternative theory for private civil 
recovery which would not entail any express causation requirement, might be based on 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(b), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78cc(b) (1964), which provides that contracts made in violation of the act shall 
confer no legal rights upon the violator. However, an implied civil cause of action 
could not be based on this section in the present case. Contractual privity would seem 
to be a necessary element under this theory, 3 Loss 1759, and privity would not be an 
effective concept for determining the right to recovery in Texas Gulf. See text accom-
panying note 80 supra. 
86. MANNE, op. cit. supra note 67, at 93-110; Whitney, supra note 62, at 201-02; 
Note, 80 HARV. L. REv. 468, 475 (1966); Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 675 (1965). It 
should be noted however that a different question is presented by Texas Gulf's 
granting of stock options to defendants before disclosure. See Texas Gulf at 290-92. 
The committee in charge of awarding stock options was in direct contact with the 
defendants and the defendants' silence could well have had a direct effect on the 
decision to grant the stock options. In a case so closely resembling common-law fraud, 
it might be completely proper to allow a private suit by the corporation, or on behalf 
of the corporation, to cancel the stock options. This type of suit would be limited in 
scope and would not be inconsistent with rejection of the broader type of civil liability 
to plaintiffs who sold on the market. 
87. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra. 
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(I) Criminal Liability 
To the extent that an in terrorem deterrent is used to effect 
compliance with the Texas Gulf IOb-5 duty, the courts should rely 
upon the substantial criminal sanctions authorized by the act. Sec-
tion 2I(e) permits the SEC to seek an injunction and, in addition, 
provides that the Commission may "transmit such evidence as may 
be available ... to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, 
institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this chapter."88 
The language of section 2l(e) thus indicates a congressional intent 
that when a penal sanction rather than a prospective injunction is 
appropriate, such a sanction should be sought by the Attorney 
General. Were the SEC to seek the imposition of penal sanctions, 
the alleged violator would be deprived of his right to a jury trial 
and the protection of section 32(a)'s requirement of willful violation, 
both of which would be available if the Attorney General were to 
prosecute the suit.89 Thus, if penal sanctions are desired, the courts 
should not try to effect such sanctions by expanding the remedies 
available to the SEC. 
Criminal suits under section 32 have played an important role 
in enforcing securities legislation, particularly insofar as they help 
to publicize the fact that the federal government does intend to 
enforce such legislation. By the end of fiscal year 1965, 1,880 de-
fendants had been convicted of criminal violations of securities 
regulations. 00 However, the Attorney General cannot be the primary 
regulator of insider trading. Since considerations of time and money 
preclude prosecution except in those cases involving a more serious 
fraud or positive misrepresentation, 91 it is doubtful that the At-
torney General could or would assume the burden of prosecuting 
the numerous cases involving the type of borderline violation at 
issue in Texas Gulf. Moreover, if the Attorney General were to 
attempt to regulate insider trading, he would be faced with the 
task of establishing in each case fraudulent intent and willful viola-
tion. 92 Since this would require proof that a defendant knew that 
88. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2l(e), 48 Stat. 899, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(e) (1964). 
89. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 48 Stat. 904, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78ff(a) (1964), provides for fines up to $10,000 for individuals and jail sentences of a 
maximum of two years "for any person who wilfully violates any provision of this 
chapter." 
90. 1965 SEC ANN. REP. 174. This figure should be compared with the total number 
of injunctions obtained by the Commission which is 3,682. Id. at 173. 
91. See 3 Loss 1993. 
92. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 48 Stat. 904, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78ff(a) (1964), punishes only willful violations of the act. It has been held that the 
corresponding provision of the Securities Act, § 24, 48 Stat. 87, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964), 
does not require proof of specific intent, bad motive, and knowledge for the imposition 
of criminal liability. United States v. Sussman, 37 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Pa. 1941). A recent 
case, however, has indicated that the requirement of willfulness will be given more 
substantial meaning when the duty violated lacks precision and clarity as in the Texas 
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the information he withheld was material-a difficult burden in 
view of the vagueness of the judicial definition of materiality-the 
expanded imposition of criminal liability would be extremely 
difficult. 
(2) Investigation and Publication 
Under section 21(a) of the act, the Commission is given the 
authority to: 
make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether 
any person has violated, or is about to violate, any provision of this 
chapter . . . . The Commission is authorized, in its discretion, to 
publish information concerning such violations •... oa 
Section 21(b) further authorizes the Commission to: 
administer oaths and affirmations, subpena witnesses, compel their 
attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any books, 
papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other records which the 
Commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry.94 
It has been suggested that the sensitivity of most corporate insiders 
about their reputations renders the SEC's power to investigate and 
publish a significant deterrent.95 Such measures have definite ad-
vantages in terms of efficiency because they do not require the 
courts to expend either time or effort. Moreover, since section 16(a) 
requires insiders to report to the Commission all transactions in 
their companies' stock,96 it is relatively easy for the SEC to spot 
potential violations of rule lOb-5. However, it is questionable 
whether investigation and publication unaccompanied by other 
sanctions would be effective in enforcing the Texas Gulf duty. Op-
portunities for personal advantage to violators are great, and the 
deterrent effect of publication may in fact be minimal since the 
business community does not seriously condemn this type of mis-
conduct.97 Furthermore, investigation will not bring violators be-
fore the courts, and the Texas Gulf duty should, in its early stages, 
be developed and defined by the courts which have the final re-
sponsibility for interpreting the act. 
(3) Injunction 
The Commission will probably continue to seek from the courts 
the more formal injunctive remedy. It is submitted that a permanent 
Gulf case. See United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 938-43 (2d Cir. 1961). See generally 
3 Loss 1984-87. 
93. 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1964). 
94. 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1964). 
95. Painter, supra note 62, at 1382. 
96. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 48 Stat. 896, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78p(a) (1964). 
97. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra. 
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injunction would have a greater psychological impact on corporate 
insiders than would investigation and publication by the SEC. 
It would also prevent future violations by the particular defendant 
involved. As noted earlier, the injunctive remedy is available in 
almost all cases since the threat of future violation can usually be 
inferred from a past violation.98 However, it is evident from Texas 
Gulf that the SEC believes that an injunction without more is not 
a sufficient remedy against a defendant who is allowed to retain 
the profits of his illegal conduct. The SEC has apparently concluded 
that the prospect of substantial profit which is immune from further 
legal sanctions more than counterbalances the threat of censure 
from either the courts or the business community.99 Such a conclu-
sion may be well-founded, particularly when the business com-
munity does not seriously condemn the conduct-insider trading-
sought to be regulated.10° Furthermore, an injunction would be 
notably ineffective against a violator who is neither attempting to 
build a reputation in the business community nor is in such a posi-
tion that it is likely that he will again have access to important in-
side information. 
(4) Preventing Unjust Enrichment 
The SEC has taken the position that the most effective means 
of enforcing the I 0b-5 duty is to deprive insiders of any profits 
acquired as a result of purchasing with an unfair advantage. It is 
submitted that this conclusion is an accurate one since only by de-
priving insiders of potential profits will the temptation to indulge 
in such activity be eliminated. In Texas Gulf, the SEC asked the 
court to order the defendants to offer their sellers an opportunity 
to rescind.101 However, rescission is both undesirable and inappro-
priate when the stock has been traded on the market and has con-
98. See text accompanying note 31 supra. 
99. See Pretrial Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff, pp. 51-52, Texas Gulf. 
100. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra. 
101. Complaint, p. 33, Texas Gulf. The SEC in Texas Gulf also requested that 
certain defendants be ordered to offer not only rescission of their own purchases, but 
also restitution for the purchases made by persons to whom they disclosed the informa-
tion. This order cannot be rationalized by any unjust enrichment theory, since the 
SEC has not alleged that these defendants profited from giving tips. Thus any order 
directing restitution for the "tippee's" purchases would be a penalty, and outside the 
SEC's power. Admittedly, the giving of inside tips may be a significant problem 
because insiders can take advantage of inside information indirectly by trading it to 
executives of other companies in exchange for a return favor at a later date. However, 
the solution to this problem is to deny the "tippee" his profit, rather than to penalize 
the person who gave the tip. If insiders were forced to make restitution for the 
purchases of their "tippees" there would be a danger that important sources of 
corporate information would dry up, for insiders would necessarily become wary of 
discussing corporate affairs with anyone who might later make purchases on the basis 
of the information they received. See Farmer, Cary, Fleischer & Halleran, supra note 62, 
at 1013-14. 
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tinued to climb since the initial disclosure of the inside informa-
tion. Rescission would deprive the violators of the increment in 
the value of their stock between the time of purchase and the bring-
ing of the suit. The SEC bases its claim for rescission on the theory 
of unjust enrichment,1°2 but the amount taken from the defendant 
by rescission may considerably exceed the amount which is justified 
by such a rationale since it would include the increment in value 
from the time at which the defendant could have legitimately pur-
chased the stock.103 Indeed, the inclusion of this amount would ap-
pear to be penal in nature and thus an infringement upon the 
powers which Congress has specifically granted to the Attorney 
General. 
This is not to suggest that the theory of unjust enrichment is 
not an appropriate basis for an SEC action against one who has 
breached the Texas Gulf duty. Indeed, an action for restitution 
based upon such a theory would be most appropriate since it would 
deprive the insider of the amount, and only the amount, by which 
he profited as a result of purchasing on the basis of material inside 
information. However, even if the order is limited to an award for 
restitution, two questions remain. First, the courts will have to 
determine precisely the measure of the amount to be recovered pur-
suant to a theory of unjust enrichment. Since the price of the stock 
will probably not change appreciably until after the disclosure of 
the material information, the gain obtained ( or loss avoided) be-
tween defendants' transactions and the moment of disclosure will 
generally be substantially less than the amount by which the defen-
dant is unjustly enriched. A more realistic measure would be the 
difference between the market value of the stock at the time of 
defendant's purchase and its value when the public reaction to the 
disclosure has been recorded on the market-the point at which the 
SEC believes insiders can legitimately· begin to transact.104 Admit-
102. Pretrial Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff, p. 51, Texas Gulf. 
103. A different argument for rescission might be advanced on the basis of Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(b), 48 Stat. 903, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964), 
which provides that contracts made in violation of the act are "void" as regards the 
rights of any person who, in violation of the act, has engaged in the performance of 
such contract. Thus, it might be said that ownership of the purchased shares never 
passed to defendants and that the shares still belong to the original holders. This argu-
ment, however, ignores the fact that it may be impossible to find the seller. It also 
disregards the fact that the defendants have rights in the stock as holders of negotiable 
instruments even if the contract of sale is "void." See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE 
§ 8-105. Indeed, in similar provisions of state blue sky laws, the word "void" has been 
interpreted to mean "voidable" since only persons in privity are allowed to rescind the 
sale and the holder of the stock is allowed to transfer good title to another purchaser. 
See 3 Loss 1632-33. It seems necessary to interpret § 29(b) in the same way since the 
statute clearly protects an innocent purchaser. Thus § 29(b) would justify rescission 
only in favor of a person in privity of contract with the defendant and would not 
apply to a regulatory suit by the SEC when the seller is unknown and probably cannot 
be found. 
104. Pretrial Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff, pp. 34-35, Texas Gulf. 
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tedly, the court in Texas Gulf held that it was not illegal for defen-
dants to purchase forty minutes after disclosure, which was before 
the information had even gone out over the Dow-Jones tape.105 
However, the court did express agreement with the Commission's 
position that transactions should not be sanctioned until the in-
formation has reached the market and indicated that its refusal to 
impose liability was based on the fact that there was no Commission 
rule that specifically condemned "gun jumping."106 If the appellate 
court takes the same position on this issue, the Commission will 
probably promulgate the necessary rule for imposing liability on 
persons who purchase before the information has been absorbed 
by the market.107 
Second, it will be necessary for the courts to determine the recip-
ient or beneficiary of the restitutionary award. Pursuant to section 27, 
which gives the courts the power to fashion appropriate remedies, 
the selection of the recipient could be left to judicial determina-
tion. One alternative is to give the amount recovered to the corpora-
tion; this would be consistent with the congressional scheme for 
dealing with illegal shortswing profits under section 16(b) of the 
act.108 Although it may be argued that it would be more appropriate 
to designate the sellers as the recipients, such an approach intro-
duces numerous administrative difficulties. For example, assuming 
that the award would be given to a master to be distributed among 
the sellers, it would still be necessary to determine with precision 
the class of sellers involved.109 Moreover, as indicated above, the 
105. Texas Gulf at 288-90. 
106. Id. at 288-89. 
107. Due to the difficulty of pinpointing the exact moment at which the public 
reaction has been absorbed by the market, the courts or the SEC will have to designate 
a reasonable, albeit arbitrary, point of time; possible alternatives include an approxima-
tion of the point when the information has gone out over the wire and brokers have 
had sufficient time to call their customers, or the point when the average investor 
would have been able to read the newspaper and call his broker. 
108. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). For the purpose of preventing 
the unfair use of inside information, § 16(b) makes the profits of officers, directors, and 
10% shareholders resulting from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of their 
corporation's stock within a period of six months recoverable by the corporation. 
In .Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949), a case relied 
upon in both Cady-Roberts and Texas Gulf as establishing the duty to forego 
transactions until after the disclosure of material information, the court ordered that 
the unjust enrichment from the insiders' transactions be paid over to the corporation. 
109. Presumably, the class of sellers entitled to recover would be composed of those 
persons who sold during a period of time starting with the violation and ending at the 
point when disclosure became effective. If trading on the market was heavy during this 
period of time it would be difficult to determine exactly which sellers were in this 
class. It seems fair to make the determination by reference to the point of time when 
the sellers decided to sell and contacted their brokers, but this would involve a difficult 
factual inquiry. If a number of defendants were involved, the master would have to 
decide whether the unjust enrichment of each defendant should be treated separately 
or combined into a common fund to be distributed to the relevant class of sellers. In 
any case similar to Texas Gulf, the number of sellers in the class entitled to recover 
would be so great that their individual recovery would be insignificant. Thus identifica-
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prime objective is to deprive the insiders of any benefits they might 
have obtained as a result of purchasing with an unfair advantage, 
and not to compensate the sellers.110 
If the courts are willing to designate the corporation as the re-
cipient of the restitutionary award obtained as the result of an SEC 
suit, they might consider as an alternative a shareholders' derivative 
suit on behalf of the corporation.111 However, although such a suit 
would relieve the SEC of a significant part of its enforcement bur-
den, it would not be an adequate substitute for an SEC action. Not 
only would the SEC lose control over its enforcement plan, but 
such an action would be difficult to justify in terms of traditional 
derivative suit theory since the corporation would not actually be 
harmed by the insider's purchases. Moreover, the appropriateness 
of a rule IOb-5 derivative suit cannot be as clearly ascertained as 
that of a similar suit for short-swing profits under section 16(b) and 
therefore to permit a 1 0b-5 derivative suit would be to put insiders 
in jeopardy of nuisance suits whenever they purchased or sold.112 
III. CONCLUSION 
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act permits the courts to 
exercise considerable discretion in the framing of remedies for viola-
tions of securities legislation. The courts must recognize, however, 
that this discretion carries with it the responsibility of assuring that 
such remedies are appropriate in light of the conduct sought to be 
regulated and effective in terms of achieving the policy objectives 
tion of the class of sellers and distribution of the fund could be deemed a waste of 
administrative effort. 
110. In cases where the corporation involved is small, transactions in its stock 
are infrequent, and defendant insiders own a large portion of the corporation's stock, 
it would be more appropriate and more practical for the court or a master to select a 
seller to receive a windfall instead of the corporation. 
111. See generally Comment, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1966); Comment, 114 U. PA. L. 
REv. 578 (1966). 
112. For enforcement by means of derivative suits to be effective, it would seem neces• 
sary to encourage private suits by following the precedent set in § 16(b) suits of paying 
the counsel fees of the plaintiff out of any judgment obtained. See 2 Loss 1051•52. 
Professor Loss has condemned the practice of allowing plaintiff's counsel fees under 
§ 16(b) because it encourages champerty; indeed, he believes that § 16(b) should be 
enforced by the SEC. Id. at 1053. Professor Cary, on the other hand, approves present 
practice under § 16(b) because it relieves the Commission of a significant enforcement 
burden. Cary, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REv. 857, 860-61 (1962). Professor Cary's 
position on the enforcement of § 16(b) may be correct, since it applies exclusively 
to the relatively well-defined situation where there has been a purchase and a sale 
by an insider within six months, and therefore presents only a limited opportunity 
for suits to be instigated by attorneys interested in contingent fees. However, a 
derivative suit for violation of the somewhat ill-defined Texas Gulf-rule l0b-5 duty 
would subject insiders to champertous nuisance suits whenever they bought or sold 
stock in their corporations. Thus, Professor Loss' condemnation of champertous suits 
is far more persuasive when the suit is based on rule IOb-5. 
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underlying the act. The preceding discussion has attempted to focus 
attention on various alternative remedies which may be used to en-
force section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. It must be re-
membered that the point of departure-the Texas Gulf Sulfur 
case-involves insider trading on a national exchange where silence 
rather than a more active type of fraud is at issue. Although most 
insider trading is included within this category, the courts will un-
doubtedly be faced with numerous situations in which the facts are 
not analogous to Texas Gulf, but a discussion of the effect of these 
variations on the remedies discussed herein will have to wait for 
another time. 
Edmund B. Frost 
